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I. INTRODUCTION
When faced with a problem of the magnitude and seriousness of
homelessness,' lawyers and policymakers often avoid theoretical spec-
ulation in favor of solutions yielding immediate results. Short-term
strategies designed to provide for the pressing needs of clients, such as
food, shelter, and medical care, are essential and appropriate as one
means of combatting homelessness.2 By not considering the role of
1. Estimates of the number of homeless people are a subject of dispute. Although a 1984
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") report approximated the number
of homeless persons as between 250,000 and 350,000; the Washington, D.C. advocacy group
Community for Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV") estimates that there are two million to
three million homeless persons in America. H.R. REP. No. 47, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 7 (1985)
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 47]. CCNV's legal challenge to the HUD report as inaccurate and
consciously designed to curtail support for federal initiatives to alleviate the problems of
homelessness failed. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
2. See Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 387
(1990-1991) (discussing three strategies used by faculty and students at Yale Law School to
alleviate the immediate shelter needs of clients and to provide for low-income housing).
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property theories in advocacy and legislation, however, homeless
advocates are disregarding potentially valuable tools in the search for
long-term solutions to homelessness.
This Comment evaluates two of the more influential approaches
to property rights-the economic utility theory3 and the personality
theory4-in the context of homelessness. It focuses on the somewhat
disparate issues of voting rights5 and "squatting"6 rights7 to illustrate
that property theories play a significant, although largely unspoken,
role in many homeless issues. Because individual rights are implicitly
defined by property ownership principles, the law presents many
obstacles for persons trying to overcome homelessness who neither
own nor control property. Thus, unless advocates, policymakers, or
the judiciary can develop alternative methods of defining rights to
necessary resources, the homeless will continue to be excluded from
many rights and privileges enjoyed by other members of our society.
In evaluating the implicit role of property theories in voting and
squatting rights, this Comment examines the potential for halting the
increase in homelessness' by applying property theories in ways to
expand voting rights and to recognize greater property entitlements.
Further, although this Comment only focuses on two of the myriad
problems faced by homeless individuals,9 it can serve as a model for
further analysis of other homeless issues. Section II defines the eco-
nomic theory of property rights and discusses its ramifications in the
context of homelessness. Section III then presents the personality
theory's alternative approach to defining property rights on the basis
of a personhood principle, and suggests arguments for a redefinition
3. For a general discussion of the economic utility theory of property rights, see infra
Section II.
4. For a general discussion of the personality theory of property, see infra Section III.
5. For an analysis of the relation of property theories to voting rights, see infra Section V.
6. "To squat is to occupy property without the permission of the owner." Borgos, Low-
Income Homeownership and the ACORN Squatters Campaign, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
HOUsING 429 (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A. Meyerson eds. 1986). For an analysis of squatting
rights and property theories, see infra Section VI.
7. Voting rights and squatting rights are disparate issues because of the contrasting
nature of the "right" involved. Voting is generally thought to be a fundamental right, see
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (recognizing voting as a fundamental right
because the right to vote is preservative of all other basic civil and political rights), while
squatting is treated by our society essentially as an illegal infringement on the property rights
of others. See Hirsch & Wood, Squatting in New York City: Justification and Strategy, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 605 (1987-1988) (noting the controversial nature of
squatters' campaigns).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that regardless of disputes over the
number of homeless people, "[tihe homeless population is increasing each year and the
homeless exist in epidemic proportions").
9. See, e.g., Law and the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261 (1990-1991).
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of our property system to achieve redistribution by giving limited
property rights to homeless persons. Next, Section IV explores the
role that the economic and personality theories play in the housing
market, the system of property rights most immediately relevant and
least responsive to homeless persons. Section V evaluates the rele-
vance of property theories to the enfranchisement of the homeless
population. Section VI turns to the issue of squatting rights and
applies the economic and personality theories to argue for a property
rights entitlement based on resource maximization and self-identifica-
tion. Finally, Section VII concludes that because economic and per-
sonality approaches to property rights play an important role in
shaping and resolving homeless issues, advocates should apply these
principles to formulate and use new arguments in attempts to find
both short- and long-term solutions to homelessness.
II. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. History and Development
The roots of the economic approach to property rights lie in the
utilitarian theory of property originally propounded by David
Hume.10 Hume's theory rejected natural or formal rights as justifica-
tions for property, suggesting instead that the laws of property were
mere conventions that people obeyed out of self-interest: i.e., that
property rights develop out of utility alone." As elaborated further
by Jeremy Bentham, property rights derive from people's expectations
of being able to gain enjoyment from what they consider to be their
own.' 2 Rights and property are thus mutually self-defining terms:
"Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws
were made there was no property; take away laws, and property
ceases.' 13 The utilitarian theory's recognition of property rights as
artificial constructs that serve as a means to achieve happiness is the
dominant contemporary view of property.'4
The "law and economics" perspective on the utilitarian theory
arose primarily out of dissatisfaction with the use of such an ephem-
eral concept as human happiness as the basis for a theory of property;
legal economists sought to take more rigorous account of what values
10. L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 67 (1977) (noting that
Hume's philosophy is the basis for conceptions of property that focus on utility rather than
formal right).
11. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 477-516 (2d ed. 1978).
12. See J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (4th ed. 1882).
13. Id. at 113.
14. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 138 (1988) (noting the prevalence of
utilitarian theory among property law scholarship).
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property rights serve to protect. 15 Essentially, the economic approach
attempts to quantify "value" by measuring it as the maximum a per-
son would be willing to pay for a thing or the minimum they would
take to give it up, in terms of a standard medium of exchange, such as
money.16 This quantitative approach forms the basis for the eco-
nomic analysis of property rights.
The further development of the economic approach is exempli-
fied by one of its preeminent spokesmen, Judge Richard Posner, in his
text Economic Analysis of Law.17 Proceeding on the basic assumption
that man is a rational maximizer of his own self-interest,", Posner
derives certain fundamental concepts: (1) that there is an inverse rela-
tion between the price charged and the quantity demanded of a
good;1 9 (2) that the cost of a good is the price that the resources con-
sumed in making and selling it would command in their next-best
use;20 and (3) that resources will gravitate toward their most valuable
uses if voluntary exchange is permitted.21 These basic economic prin-
ciples lead to the conclusion that the value of a thing is determined by
15. L. BECKER, supra note 10, at 67.
16. Id. at 67-68.
17. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1988). As the following analysis
will make clear, this Comment's discussion of the "law and economics" approach focuses
primarily on Posner's theory as voiced in Economic Analysis of Law. Although Posner is
certainly not the only scholar to apply economic theory to the study of law, and his mode of
analysis is not singularly representative of all forms of economic analysis, the widespread use
of Posner's text and the influence his judicial opinions wield, see Comment, Posnerian
Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1117, 1117 n.1 (1985) (estimating that Posner's opinions had been used as precedent in
approximately 1,000 cases), make his theory an appropriate model for evaluating the nature
and impact of "law and economics." For a discussion of the influence of Posner's theory and
variant approaches to and critiques of economic analysis, see, e.g., Ellickson, Bringing Culture
and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 23 (1989) (evaluating the influence of classical law and economics since the
publication of Economic Analysis of Law and proposing an enrichment of the theory through
the fields of sociology and psychology); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 452 (1974) (describing Posner's text as "just a fatly reified
symbol of a currently important trend"); and Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property
Rights-The Need for Moral Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 163 n.6 (1986) (noting that Posner best represents the legal economics
scholars and generally evaluating the problems of moral neutrality in economic analysis).
8. R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 3.
19. Id. at 4. For instance, if the price of steak increases by 10c per pound, some rational
self-interested consumers will substitute a cheaper alternative food, and demand will decrease.
Id.
20. Id. at 7. The cost of an item to the manufacturer is the price for the materials, labor,
and resources that go into making it. That price must equal or exceed the price for which the
resources would have sold to the next-highest bidder. Id.
21. Id. at 8. The party who pays the highest price for a resource does so because he can
obtain a more valuable output from it. Id.
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the exchanges people will engage in to buy or sell it.22 Essentially,
what this means is that in a free-market system, all goods will be put
to their best uses because those people who derive the most value
from them will give the most to obtain them.
Thus, in the realm of property, the ultimate goal in rights devel-
opment is efficiency.23 Posner suggests three criteria essential to an
efficient system of property rights: (1) universality-that all resources
be owned (and thus valued) by someone, except for unlimited
resources whose value is not diminished by others' use of them;24 (2)
exclusivity-that a person be able to prevent others from using his
property (giving greater incentives to invest the proper amount of
resources in the property);25 and (3) transferability-that property can
be shifted from less to more valuable uses through free exchange. 26
The theoretical framework of this economic perspective provides a
powerful justification for a free-market approach to property rights
and, as this Comment later argues, virtually dominates our entire sys-
tem of real property ownership.2 7 The economic approach to prop-
erty rights thus plays an intrinsic role in how property-related issues
are dealt with in our legal system.
B. Economic Theory and Homelessness
Juxtaposing the law and economics approach to property rights
with the dilemmas of homelessness raises some problematic theoreti-
cal issues. Legal economists speak of efficiency as the primary (and
perhaps only) goal of a legal system, 28 and define it as the use of eco-
nomic resources so as to maximize human satisfaction "as measured
by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services." '29
But in doing so, the theory implicitly assumes that all people have the
ability to achieve and satisfy their desires-that they have control
over some valuable resources to exchange. In a critique of Posner's
text, Professor Arthur Leff points out this flaw:
In such a system whatever is, is. If you do not "buy" something,
you are unwilling to do so. There is no place for the word or con-
22. Id at 10.
23. Id. at 4. Efficiency is defined in a technical sense as "exploiting resources in such a
way that human satisfaction as measured by aggregate willingness to pay for goods and
services is maximized." Id.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 30.
27. For a discussion of the role of economic theory in the housing market, see infra notes
67-84 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 6.
29. Id. at 4.
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cept "unable." Thus, in this system, there is nothing which is
coerced. For instance, let us say that a starving man approaches a
loaf of bread held by an armed baker. Another potential buyer is
there. The baker institutes an auction; he wants cash only (having
too great doubts about the starveling's health to be interested in
granting credit). The poor man gropes in his pockets and comes
up with a dollar. The other bidder immediately takes out $1.01
and makes off with the bread. Now under Posner's definitional
system we must say that the "value" of the bread was no more
than a dollar to the poor man because he was "unwilling" to pay
more than that. An observer not bound within that particular defi-
nitional structure might find it somehow more illuminating to
characterize the poor man's failure as being the result of being
unable to pay more than a dollar. But one cannot, consistent with
Posner's system, say any such thing. One's actual power is
irrelevant.30
Leff's parable makes clear that the efficiency criterion of the eco-
nomic approach to property rights implicitly assumes that everyone
already possesses bargaining power (and hence rights) within the sys-
tem. Essentially, property rights and human rights merge in the eco-
nomic approach:
It is a mistake to try to contrast human rights and property rights.
Property rights are human rights to the use of economic goods. To
see a conflict between human rights to use property and civil rights
is equally misguided. Civil rights do not conflict with human
rights to use goods.31
A system that defines and justifies rights exclusively in terms of con-
trol over resources indeed may find it impossible to distinguish
between human and property rights.
Although the interrelation of human rights and property rights is
not a novel concept,32 the absolute equation suggested by economic
analysis can have dangerous consequences in the context of homeless-
ness. Defining human rights by one's ownership or control over prop-
30. Leff, supra note 17, at 478-79.
31. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION 114 (2d ed. 1977). This view
has not gone without criticism from other legal economists: "When human rights and
property rights are assigned equivalent values, the danger emerges that the logical conclusions
of economic analysis may result in policy directives so contrary to the normative values of the
society that both the economic and legal systems are discredited by society." Malloy, supra
note 17, at 165.
32. "Americans of the founding generation understood property ... as a basic human
right, essential to one's existence, to one's independence, to one's dignity as a person. Without
property, real and personal, one could not enjoy life or liberty, and could not be free and
independent." Levy, Property as a Human Right, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 169, 175 (1988).
This notion is very similar to the approach of the personality theory discussed later in this
Comment. See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 45:701
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erty-for instance, requiring a property right as a prerequisite to the
exercise of other rights-virtually excludes the homeless from the
entire system of rights. In a system literally 'equating human rights
and property rights, homeless persons would be nonentities with no
rights to be protected.3 a
Although this result seems morally repugnant when stated
explicitly, the economic approach as a matter of theory ignores such
consequences under the guise of moral neutrality. Economic theory
proponents explain that it can do nothing to determine whether
existing wealth distribution patterns are just or good, but serves only
as a means to determine the effect of legal rules on efficiency and
value, and on the existing distribution of wealth.3 4 But this justifica-
tion is essentially nonresponsive. The critique of the economic
approach is not that it fails to call for redistribution, 5 but rather that
it, by definition, excludes those who do not have resources. The prob-
lem is not that some have more than others; it is that those who do
not have are considered without rights in the system. a
This qualm with the economic approach does not exist merely in
the realm of theory. Indeed, several of the problems that the home-
less face arise because certain rights and benefits are made available
only to persons with a permanent place of residence.3 7 When basic
33. This is perhaps an exaggeration, considering that the homeless are not completely
without any resources whatsoever. Nonetheless, they are for most purposes economically
powerless, particularly where real property rights (i.e., housing) are treated as a prerequisite
for other rights, (i.e., voting). See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
34. R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 10. For a debate between Robin Malloy and Richard
Posner on the morality of law and economics, see Debate: Is Law and Economics Moral?, 24
VAL. U.L. REV. 147 (1990).
35. Indeed, theoretically the economic approach would not necessarily be adverse to
redistribution of resources, provided that once distributed, exclusivity of ownership and free
exchange were permitted. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 29-30. If economic analysis
is used merely as a descriptive tool, it simply evaluates the value-maximizing effects of the
redistribution; if economic analysis is applied positively to examine how resources could be
more efficiently used, it in fact does provide a redistributive mandate. For an analysis of the
potential positive use of economic theory in the context of squatting rights, see infra notes 151-
65 and accompanying text.
36. An alternative construction of the economic approach's perspective on the homeless
would not base the denial of rights simply on the fact that they have no property, but that
somehow the failure to have such resources indicates that they are not "rational maximizers"
of their own self-interest. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 3. This analysis may explain
the "blame factor" often attached to the homeless-that is, that they are solely responsible for
their own plight. Indeed, former President Reagan once commented that many homeless
persons "make it their own choice," adding that "[y]ou'll find anywhere from 60 to 75 full
pages of help-wanted ads" in the Washington Post every Sunday. Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1988,
at A8, col. 3.
37. For example, homeless persons have been denied the right to vote, see infra notes 89-
105, the right to education, see NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, BROKEN LIVES:
DENIAL OF EDUCATION TO HOMELESS CHILDREN (1987), and eligibility for certain forms of
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personal rights are made contingent upon property rights, the under-
lying influences of economic analysis and its resulting problems for
the homeless become apparent. Nonetheless, homeless advocates can
recognize the role of economic theory in arguing for a recognition and
expansion of personal rights and potentially use its mode of analysis
to their advantage.
III. THE PERSONALITY THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. History and Development
The origins of the personality theory of property lie in the philos-
ophy of Hegel, which suggests that property rights play an essential
role in the full development and self-realization of individuals."a In
Hegel's philosophy, property occupancy serves as a means by which
individuals project their abstract wills into the external world. 9
Thus, according to Hegel, the creation and development of property
rights is inextricably bound with the personal relationship between
individuals and property-a direct contrast to the economic theory's
emphasis on the utilitarian nature of property rights.4°
The personality theory and its relationship to American property
law have been analyzed and developed by Professor Margaret Jane
Radin in Property and Personhood.4' The basis of Radin's approach is
that an individual must have some control over resources in the exter-
nal environment to achieve proper personal self-development, and
that property rights are the assurances of that control. 2 Radin posits
this theory as an intuitive argument: Most people have certain irre-
placeable objects that they identify as "almost part of themselves,"
which are different from other types of replaceable objects.43 Because
governmental assistance, see McKittrick, The Homeless: Judicial Intervention on Behalf of a
Politically Powerless Group, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 389, 398 (1988), because of their lack of
permanent residence. Some of these problems have been at least partially addressed by
Congress through the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301
(1990), and the Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3374
(1986) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. 38 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
38. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1967). For an in-depth analysis of Hegel's theory
of property, see generally Stillman, Hegel's Analysis of Property in the Philosophy of Right, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (1989).
39. "A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any and every
thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and
soul from his will." G. HEGEL, supra note 38, para. 44.
40. See generally Stillman, supra note 38, for a discussion of the relationship of Hegel's
philosophy to the development of property rights.
41. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 959. Radin gives as common examples a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom,
or a house. Id.
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of this strong personal connection, the personality theory argues that
individuals should be given broad liberty to control these personal
objects." In a more formal Hegelian analysis, the argument is that a
person (defined as an abstract autonomous rationality) becomes a
fully developed individual through establishing relationships with
objects; thus, an individual's will becomes embodied in property.45
The basic premise of the personality approach is that the close interre-
lation between certain forms of property and personhood justify, to
some extent, the creation of property rights.
From this analysis, Radin makes a distinction between different
types of property as well, which she calls the "personhood dichot-
omy." 6 She distinguishes between fungible property that has a cer-
tain fiscal value and which will be relinquished for a proper price, and
personal property that has an individual meaning which can super-
sede simple fiscal value.47 This distinction also recognizes that the
same item may have significant personal value to one person while
being merely fungible to another. For example, a wedding ring would
be fungible property to a jeweler, and personal property to the
wearer.48 Because a person is more intimately associated with "per-
sonal" property, personality theory suggests that the law should
afford more protection to these personal property rights than to mere
fungible property interests.49 Thus, the personality theory provides
not only a justification for property rights, but a means to establish
different types or degrees of rights based on the significance of the
relationship between property and person.
Radin demonstrates the implicit role that the personality
approach has played in areas ranging from takings50 to fourth amend-
44. Id. at 959-60.
45. See id. at 971-77; see also G. HEGEL, supra note 38, paras. 44-45.
46. Radin, supra note 41, at 986.
47. For Radin's development of the distinction between fungible and personal property,
see id. at 959-60 & 986-88.
48. Id. at 959. This "personhood dichotomy" thus focuses on an element ignored by
economic theory-the personal, non-economic relation of individuals to property.
49. Id. at 986-88. Radin compares the different degrees of legal protection to be afforded
to different degrees of property identification with Calabresi's theory of property rules
(suggesting injunctive remedies) and liability rules (suggesting damages). Id. (citing Calabresi
& Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972)). Although denying that a neat correlation can be drawn (i.e.,
fungible property should only be protected by liability rules; personal property should be
protected by property rules), Radin suggests that at least personal property should be
protected by property rules. Id. at 988.
50. Radin suggests that the paradoxical tendency of courts to require compensation for
seizure of small, discrete units of property while allowing large losses in dollar value due to
zoning regulations, for instance, to go uncompensated, is explained by recognizing the personal
right in discrete units of specific property versus total assets. Id. at 1002; see also Radin, The
1990-1991]
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ment protections,51 and how its explicit application can assist in the
resolution of these disparate property issues.52 As this Comment
illustrates, the personality theory also may prove to be a useful tool in
the analysis of issues directly affecting the homeless.53
B. Personality Theory and Homelessness
What is curious about the personality theory is that, in the con-
text of homelessness, it can be interpreted to suggest several different,
and perhaps contradictory, ideas. While seemingly diametrically
opposed to the economic approach to property rights, 4 the personal-
ity theory arguably dictates the same results: If individuals do not
manifest and develop personhood except through the control of
resources in the external environment, then those without resources
to control are not recognized as individuals. Once again, the home-
less would be considered outside of the social and legal system, with-
out rights to be protected. As long as property forms the basis for
defining human rights, whether the theory used is based on per-
sonhood or economics, the homeless are effectively non-entities in the
system of rights.
But such an analysis of the personality theory would be more
sophistry than anything else, because the personality theory explicitly
disclaims the equation drawn by economic theorists between property
ownership and personal rights, maintaining a distinction between
property and basic human rights.5 5 Indeed, Radin suggests that
"[tihe personhood dichotomy in property, by focusing attention on
the importance of certain property to self-constitution, can avoid
some distortions that might result from justifications in which all enti-
tlements are considered alike. ' '5 6 By noting the distinction between
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1667 (1988).
51. Radin utilizes the role of a personhood perspective on property to explain the shifting
conception of the fourth amendment from a provision that protects property to one that
protects personal privacy, particularly in the context of special rules developed in regard to the
"sanctity of the home." Radin, supra note 41, at 996-1002.
52. See id. at 991-1013.
53. See infra notes 110-14 & 166-83 and accompanying text for an evaluation of
personality theory in the contexts of voting rights and squatting rights, respectively.
54. Radin bases the justification of property rights on their necessity to self-development,
see supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text, whereas the economic theory rests on goals of
efficiency and resource maximization, see supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
55. Radin, supra note 41, at 989.
56. Id. at 988. Radin observes that an economic model based on efficiency criteria would
fail to consider different personal and social values; further,.a system based on property rights
as defining all other rights would allow property interests to outweigh civil liberties. Id at 988
n.109.
[Vol. 45:701
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property and personhood, the personality theory is not subject to
some of the pitfalls of the economic approach to property rights
because it does not exclude persons who do not own property from
the realm of human rights. While there is an intimate connection
between certain types of property and personal development, the per-
son himself is a fundamentally independent source of rights.
Furthermore, unlike the economic approach, the personality the-
ory does not claim or espouse moral neutrality. Radin makes clear
that her development of the personhood perspective is a "non-utilita-
rian, moral theory which would provide an alternative explanation for
the observed hierarchy of protection, as well as help us to critique it
where it goes wrong." 5 The theory, in drawing distinctions between
different types of property depending on their connection with per-
sonhood, explicitly allows individuals to make moral distinctions
regarding the kind of protection that should be afforded to a person's
right in the property.
Ironically, although the personality theory philosophically makes
distinctions based on one's personal connection to property regardless
of actual ownership,5" and can serve as a method to expand rights for
persons without resources, it holds little potential as a tool for reform
of a property system in which rights are already defined in economic
terms. In other words, in a predominantly free-market structure fun-
damentally based on economic theories of law,59 the personality the-
ory may simply reinforce existing hierarchies of rights that
disadvantage the homeless. If the legal economists' equation between
human and property rights forms the primary basis for our concep-
tion and delineation of rights (that is, only those who own property
have rights), and the personality theory operates within that system to
justify protecting the rights of persons who already have had the
opportunity to "constitute" themselves in property, then the use of
personality theory fails to provide support for the rights of the home-
less. In 'fact, it exacerbates the exclusion of the homeless from the
system of rights by only protecting persons who already have the
means to own property.' For a personality approach to do more
than simply reinforce the status quo in the context of homelessness,
57. Id at 985.
58. Adverse possession is one of many ways that one could develop a personal connection
to property without actual ownership.
59. See infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of the interrelated roles these theories play in the context of
governmental intervention in the housing market, see infra notes 67-88 and accompanying
text.
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its emphasis on the relation between personhood and property must
do more than protect those who already have property.
C. Property as a Human Right
Taking the basic premise that property rights play an integral
role in personal development a step further yields a radical, yet poten-
tially useful, argument in the context of homelessness. If property is
essential to personhood, then it follows that a society might bear a
responsibility to provide at least a minimal property entitlement nec-
essary for self-development to all its members. Radin addresses, but
does not unequivocally endorse, such an argument by noting:
A welfare rights or minimal entitlement theory of just distribution
might hold that a government that respects personhood must guar-
antee citizens all entitlements necessary for personhood. If the per-
sonhood dichotomy in property is taken as the source of a
distributive mandate as part of such a general theory, it would sug-
gest that government should make it possible for all citizens to
have whatever property is necessary for personhood.61
Furthermore, this minimal entitlement argument suggests that prop-
erty rights should be rearranged so that fungible property ownership
by some persons does not prevent others from constituting themselves
in property at all.62 Essentially, the theory posits the use of property
rights to achieve wealth redistribution. The minimal entitlement
analysis has been taken so far as to yield a "New Bill of Property
Rights" 63 whereby all members of society must be guaranteed access
to the store of public resources sufficient for individuals to realize
their full human potentials."M
Some commentators have characterized the minimal entitlement
argument as "turn[ing] the concept of property on its head."
6
Indeed, it may be fundamentally inimical to a predominantly free-
61. Radin, supra note 41, at 990.
62. Id. at 990-91.
63. Kent, Property, Power, and Authority, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 541 (1975) (arguing that
property ownership is a fundamental right, and that present property ownership structures
should be reorganized to provide all members of society with some minimal property
entitlement).
64. Id. In fact, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly guarantees a right to
a minimal standard of living: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services.... " Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art.
25(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (adopted Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis
added). In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 n.14 (1970), Justice Marshall suggested
in dissent that Article 25(1) supported the argument for subsistence rights.
65. Ansell, Property Versus Civil Rights: An Alternative to the Double Standard, 11 N. KY.
L. REV. 51, 125 (1984).
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market system of property rights. Although the usefulness of a mini-
mal entitlement theory in a purely legal context might require a radi-
cal restructuring of our system and conception of property rights, on
a moral level it provides a strong basis for the protection of the home-
less. The implication is that a government's responsibility does not
end with the mere provision of emergency shelter to the homeless.
Because the level of self-identification an individual can have in a tem-
porary shelter would seem insufficient to ensure development of the
conception of personhood espoused by the personality approach, a
government that respects personhood must also provide the resources
necessary to ensure permanent housing for all of its citizens."
IV. THEORIES OF PROPERTY AND THE HOUSING MARKET
The economic approach to property is most immediately relevant
to homelessness not merely for its implications as a theory of rights,
but because it provides the philosophical underpinnings for a housing
market often cited as a major cause of homelessness.67 Indeed, this
Comment argues that an understanding of the legal economists' posi-
tion is essential to an understanding of the housing market because
the American housing system operates essentially as economic analy-
sis proponents would have it do so.
Housing in the United States is, for the most part, a commodity
dominated by the private sector 68-that is, one in which basic eco-
66. Radin acknowledges the possibility of this argument: "[Playing attention to the notion
of personal property would lead not merely to a right to shelter in general, but a right to a
particular house or apartment." Radin, supra note 41, at 990 n. 115. This analysis impliedly
assumes that housing for the homeless is of the personal, rather than fungible, variety of right.
Id. at 959 (distinguishing fungible property which is freely transferable from personal property
to which an individual has intimate attachments). The realities of homelessness would seem to
indicate otherwise. The most immediate issue is ensuring basic shelter. Any kind of housing
with adequate facilities would suffice, making shelter a fungible item in the personality theory's
approach. Characterizing shelter as a fungible property interest, however, serves more to
indicate the extent of depersonalization caused by homelessness, rather than to argue against a
moral responsibility to provide permanent housing. Shelter, as a basic human necessity, may
indeed be fungible-but a society that respects personhood should go further to ensure that all
of its members have property entitlements beyond the bare necessities of self-development.
67. The scarcity of low-cost housing is a factor commonly implicated in the increase in the
number of homeless Americans. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 8 (calling the scarcity of
low-cost housing the "main cause of homelessness"); see also Collins & Barry, Homelessness: A
Post-Industrial Society Faces a Legislative Dilemma, 20 AKRON L. REV. 409, 412 (1987)
(noting the numbers of people involuntarily displaced from homes and loss of low-income
housing due to various factors as indicative of a growing need for basic shelter); Comment,
Homeless in America: Looking for a Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 305, 311
(1985) (describing the scarcity of low-cost housing as a major factor in the recent increase in
homelessness).
68. Achtenberg & Marcuse, The Causes of the Housing Problem, in CRITICAL
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nomic principles of supply and demand, economic cost, and free
exchange69 ostensibly determine the supply, cost, quantity, and loca-
tion of housing. 70 The consequences of this approach to the housing
market are manifold. The initial costs of constructing housing are
increased by rising land and construction loan interest rates.71 Costs
are further increased when successive owners trade for profit.72 Pro-
duction and maintenance is limited in poor or "high-risk" areas
because the players in the private housing sector (developers, specula-
tors, producers, and lenders) will only invest in housing where they
can make a profit, leading to housing abandonment in poorer areas.73
As maintaining housing in low-income areas becomes less profitable,
and constructing new housing more expensive, low-income housing
becomes scarce, particularly in inner-city areas.74 The ultimate result
is an increase in homelessness. 75 The free-market approach to hous-
ing, although theoretically ensuring that all resources are put to their
best uses, operates to deny housing to the needy. This is not a surpris-
ing result, however, considering that an economic approach values
"efficiency" and "human satisfaction" only through aggregate willing-
ness to pay.76 In essence, the failure of the market to respond to low-
income housing needs is Leff's parable 77 played out in the real world.
The characterization of the housing market as a predominantly
free-market private enterprise system is not meant to imply that the
government has not played a role in housing policy. Indeed, the fed-
eral government has been involved in the housing sector at least since
the New Deal.78 Until the 1960's, however, federal housing policy
mainly sought to provide financing to the housing sector to increase
production; and the middle class were the primary beneficiaries of this
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that housing is treated not as a social
good but as a source of private profit).
69. For a further discussion of the economic principles that affect the housing market, see
supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
70. Achtenberg & Marcuse, supra note 68 at 5.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Comment, supra note 67, at 311-12.
75. Id.
76. R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 4 (The goal of a system of rights in the economic
approach is to maximize "human satisfaction" as measured by "aggregate willingness to pay"
for resources.).
77. For the text of Leff's parable criticizing the efficiency criterion of economic analysis,
see supra text accompanying note 30.
78. R. STRUYK, M. TURNER & M. UENO, FUTURE U.S. HOUSING POLICY: MEETING
THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE 55 (1988) (discussing the history of federal housing
initiatives).
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policy. 79 The 1960's were marked by a greater attention to the hous-
ing needs of the poor, 0 but federal initiatives still relied primarily on
the private sector to provide low-income housing through mortgage
subsidies, tax incentives, and operating cost subsidies, with public
housing regarded as a last resort.8" Although the recent deregulation
of the housing finance system has provided more mortgage money, it
has, at the same time, increased the cost of home ownership. 2
The nature of governmental activity in the housing market sug-
gests that while there has been some governmental involvement, fed-
eral initiatives have relied primarily on the private sector to ensure
adequate housing, including housing for low-income households.
Where the government does step in, its role is usually to provide an
economic impetus to the private housing market (i.e., by providing
easily available mortgage money or tax incentives) rather than direct
intervention. The government's economic assistance measures are
fundamentally in accord with the economic approach's precepts of
exclusivity of ownership and free exchange as guarantees of resource
maximization because of the reliance on the free market and the
encouragement of private ownership.8 3 But the free market, even
with governmental encouragement, has failed to provide sufficient
low-income housing, ultimately resulting in a rise in homelessness.
84
In sum, a housing policy based primarily on the private sector's abil-
ity to maximize resources efficiently has proven to be insufficient in
combating homelessness.
79. Id. at 59, 63. For example, although the Low Rent Public Housing Program of 1937,
42 U.S.C. § 1437a-s (1988), provided housing for the poor by supporting slum clearance and
rebuilding decent low-rent housing, the primary purpose of the program was to benefit society
by eradicating "dangerous" slum neighborhoods and creating jobs, not to assist the needy. R.
STRUYK, M. TURNER & M. UENO, supra note 78, at 58.
80. R. STRUYK, M. TURNER & M. ENo, supra note 78, at 64. Struyk describes the four
basic strategies of housing policy in the 1960's as follows: (1) make homeownership more
accessible to low- and moderate-income families; (2) provide tax and financing incentives to
encourage private investment in low-income rental housing; (3) supplement rental payments to
private rental companies to encourage private participation in the low-income rental market;
and (4) ensure that public housing will be affordable even for the poorest households. Id. at
65.
81. Id. at 67.
82. Id. at 71-73. Between 1973 and 1980, federal regulations regarding the thrift industry
were gradually relaxed to make more mortgage money available. Id. at 72. Over roughly the
same period (between 1970 and 1980), the average price of a single-family dwelling rose from
$23,000 to over $62,000. Wright & Lam, Homelessness and the Low-Income Housing Supply,
17 Soc. POL'Y 48, 49 (1987).
83. For a discussion of the economic theory's espousal of these principles, see supra notes
17-27 and accompanying text.
84. See H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the connection between dwindling
low-income housing supply and increasing homelessness).
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The personality theory plays a role in shaping the government's
actions in the housing market, although its influence may not be as
readily apparent as the economic approach's impact on governmental
decisions. The personality approach, when operating within a
predominantly free-market context, may reinforce the rights of those
who already own property while disregarding the rights of those who
do not.8" The governmental emphasis on easing financing for owner-
occupied housing, particularly for middle-class households through
programs such as mortgage interest subsidies, suggests an implicit
recognition of the importance of individual property ownership
(rather than rental). This concept is quite amenable to the personality
theory's focus on the relationship between personhood and prop-
erty.86 This approach, however, primarily benefits those persons who
already have a relatively significant share of resources to acquire
housing, while doing little to respond to the importance of property
ownership (or, at the least, any form of housing) for the truly needy.
Indeed, while federal support for low-income housing programs has
been reduced to $7.5 billion (a seventy-five percent drop since 198 1),17
the federal government's support for middle-class homeownership
through the mortgage interest deduction amounts to a $34 billion
yearly tax expenditure, which is expected to rise to nearly $40 billion
in 1990.88 Thus, the personality theory may implicitly justify some
governmental action in the housing market on the basis of the impor-
tance of property ownership to personhood. Such justification, how-
ever, is of questionable value to the homeless absent a call for
increased emphasis on the significance of property ownership to those
with scant resources.
85. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
86. Although there is a cognizable personal connection with residential rental property,
Radin, supra note 41, at 993 (noting that the law increasingly recognizes the personal interest
in residential leases through tenants' rights), there is an intuitive, qualitative difference between
renting and owning one's own home. The intimate personal connection involved in ownership
of a residence, in part, explains the governmental preference for homeownership.
87. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED
STATES: BACKGROUND AND FEDERAL RESPONSE-A BRIEFING PAPER FOR
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES 74 (1988) (noting that the federal budget for subsidized and
public housing programs has been cut from $32 billion to $7.5 billion).
88. Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1990, at El, col. 6. The article also notes that individuals may
deduct up to one million dollars in mortgage interest payments for both primary and
secondary homes (often vacation homes), as well as another $100,000 in home equity loan
interest that is used to finance other purchases. Id. These policies vividly demonstrate the tilt
of federal housing policy toward those who already have the means to obtain permanent
housing.
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V. HOMELESS VOTING RIGHTS AND PROPERTY THEORIES
A. Traditional Voter Registration Standards and Recent Responses
The relationship between property rights and human rights can
be illustrated by analyzing the enfranchisement of the homeless popu-
lation. Voting rights serve as an example of how the homeless' lack of
property-holder status can directly affect their non-property rights.
Traditionally, the eligibility to vote is determined primarily by a resi-
dency requirement.89 One must possess a traditional home or be
domiciled in the district to register. 9 The historical rationale for this
sort of residency requirement is that it ensures that a voter is a bona
fide member of the community and has a common interest in the
issues being voted upon.91 Courts repeatedly have recognized states'
compelling interest in preserving their political community, and con-
sistently have upheld states' power to limit the voting community to
bona fide residents. 92 Yet, by definition, residency requirements dis-
enfranchise the homeless population.93
This traditional approach has recently come under challenge,
however. In 1984, the Philadelphia and District of Columbia election
boards enacted plans enabling the homeless to register to vote.94 Soon
after, in Pitts v. Black,95 homeless plaintiffs brought a class action suit
against New York city and state election officials, seeking to enjoin
89. Note, Disenfranchisement of Homeless Persons, 31 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 225-26
(1987).
90. Id. at 226.
91. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1971) (explaining traditional justifications for
voter residency requirements).
92. Id. at 343 (citing Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965); and Pope
v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904)).
93. The extent of the exclusion of the homeless from voting is somewhat dependent on
how homelessness is defined. A broad definition of homelessness includes people forced to
"double up" with family or friends because they lack a place of their own. See, e.g., Hopper &
Hamberg, The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to New Poor, 1945-1984, in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 6, at 29 (characterizing low-income
families forced together into overcrowded living arrangements as a form of borderline
homelessness). Individuals who double up do not face the same voter registration problems as
those who sleep in shelters or on the street because they caq provide a "permanent" address at
a traditional residence, albeit not their own.
94. In Philadelphia, a federal district court entered a consent decree giving the homeless
the right to vote. See Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696, 701, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing
and citing Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v. Tartaglione, No. 84-
3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984) (unreported order)). In the District of Columbia, the Election
Board adopted regulations allowing the homeless to register to vote. See id. at 707-08
(discussing In re Jenkins, slip op. (District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, June 7,
1984); and D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1302(16)(A) (Supp. 1984)).
95. 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the Election Board from applying residency requirements that would
completely disenfranchise the homeless.96 The federal district court's
analysis of this issue demonstrates the interplay of the different con-
ceptions of personal and property rights as they relate to voting rights
issues.
The Election Board claimed that its definition of "residence, 97
while excluding the entire homeless population, was necessary to
ensure that voters have a verifiable nexus to the community, to pre-
vent fraudulent voting, and to maintain administrative feasibility in
the registration and voting process. 9 The homeless plaintiffs, how-
ever, offered a different conception of residence: "the act of being in
one geographical locale, where one performs the usual functions of
sleeping, eating and living in accordance with one's life style, and a
place to which one, 'wherever temporarily located' always intends to
return." 99
The court rejected the Election Board's insistence on the tradi-
tional definition of residence, stating that "the key objective is to
ascertain 'the place which is the center of an individual's life, ... the
locus of his primary concern,' and the place the individual presently
intends to remain,"' 1° effectively accepting the homeless plaintiffs'
definition. The court enjoined the Election Board from basing home-
less persons' right to vote on the traditional residency requirement if
it prevented them from registering at all.101 The decision also out-
lined a residency standard which allows homeless persons to register
to vote: "Homeless individuals [may register by] identifying a specific
location within a political community which they consider their
'home base,' to which they return regularly, manifest an intent to
remain for the present, and a place from which they can receive
messages and be contacted."' 1 2 Thus, the decision extended the right
to vote to homeless individuals whose "residence" could be a tempo-
rary shelter or even a park bench. 03
Similarly, the plans adopted by Philadelphia and the District of
Columbia use non-traditional standards to enfranchise the homeless.
96. Id.
97. The Election Law definedresidence as "that place where a person maintains a fixed,
permanent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends
to return." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104(22) (McKinney 1990).
98. Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 699.
99. Id. at 698.
100. Id. at 709 (quoting Ramsey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972))
(citations omitted).
101. Id. at 708.
102. Id. at 710.
103. Id. at 703.
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In Philadelphia, homeless persons may list the address of a shelter
where they have an established relationship for registration pur-
poses.l°4 In the District of Columbia, regulations allow homeless per-
sons to indicate a specific location where they presently intend to
remain for voting purposes."°5 The standards thus focus on the intent
of the person to reside at a specified location rather than the legal
right of access to a dwelling.
B. The Role of Property Theories
The homeless voting rights issue and recent legislative and judi-
cial responses demonstrate, on an implicit level, the interplay between
the utilitarian economic conception of rights and the personality
approach. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that voting is
not typically regarded as a "property" right. Indeed, although not
specifically delineated in the Constitution or its amendments,1°6 vot-
ing is recognized as a fundamental right essential to the preservation
of all other rights.1 7 Nonetheless, the effective consequence of the
traditional residency requirement is to ensure that the right to vote is
held only by persons with the means to possess a traditional home or
domicile. Ultimately, a right regarded as fundamental becomes inex-
tricably bound to a property right.
The connection between voting rights and property rights dem-
onstrates the dangers of an economic utility theory of rights in mat-
ters involving the homeless. This Comment does not suggest that the
original drafters of residency requirements for voter registration con-
sciously underwent a Posnefian economic analysis in determining that
registrants must have a traditional home or domicile in the district to
be eligible to vote; nor does it mean to imply that proponents of eco-
nomic theory seek the results that ensue from such standards.
Rather, the problem is that a system of rights whose philosophical
104. See id. at 701, 708 (discussing and citing Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for
the Homeless v. Tartaglione, No. 84-3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984) (unpublished order)).
According to the Philadelphia plan, homeless individuals must designate a shelter with which
they have an "established relationship," but they are not required to live there. Note, supra
note 89, at 235.
105. See Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 707-08 (discussing In re Jenkins, slip op. (District of
Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, June 7, 1984)). The Election Board, in promulgating
regulations that allow a prospective registrant to designate any specific location in the voting
district as a "residence," emphasized intent over possessory interest. Note, supra note 89, at
235 n.65.
106. By implication, the right to vote is recognized by the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-
sixth amendments, which protect the voting rights of Blacks, women, and persons over 18,
respectively. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX & XXVI.
107. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (recognizing voting as a fundamental right
because the right to vote is preservative of all other basic civil and political rights).
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underpinning regards human and property rights as equivalent, or
that uses property rights as a prerequisite to exercising other rights,
will have the unintentional but unavoidable consequence of excluding
the homeless. The response of Thomas Wallace, Executive Director
of the New York State Board of Elections, when asked in Pitts v.
Black 10 8 why an individual who gives a park bench as his address
would not quality as a resident, vividly illustrates the operation of the
traditional residency approach: "The statute requires a fixed, perma-
nent home and whenever temporarily absent, the person intends to
return. I see that definition as carrying with it a requirement that the
person have a right to the physical location, to the property." 1°9
Thus, the equating of a human right with a property right has as its
ultimate result the exclusion of the homeless in a most concrete
manner.
The recent judicial and administrative responses to this issue
demonstrate a recognition of the problem of basing voting rights on
property rights, and incorporate an approach more akin to the per-
sonality theory.110 At a most fundamental level, the rejection of stan-
dards that require possession of a traditional home or domicile
indicates a severing of the link between the fundamental right to vote
and a right to some property in the district. The personality theory's
recognition of a distinction between human rights and property rights
thus becomes an essential tool in enfranchising the homeless popula-
tion. Only when election boards recognize that the fundamental right
to vote can (and must) exist independent of any property right can
standards be developed that allow the homeless to register.
Analysis of the standards enunciated by the courts and election
boards to ensure enfranchisement of the homeless demonstrates a util-
ization of some of the basic conceptions of personality theory.1"
Once judges or election boards determine that the homeless have the
right to vote regardless of their possession of a traditional residence,
they still must develop registration procedures that will protect the
108. 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
109. Trial Transcript at 192, Pitts (No. 84 Civ. 5270 (MJL)), cited in Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at
698 (emphasis added).
110. By basing residency requirements on one's personal identification with property as a
home or shelter, these non-traditional voting standards disregard the ownership principle in
favor of a personhood principle. For a general discussion of the personality theory, see supra
notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
111. A central conception of the personality theory is that a cognizable interest arises out of
a person's identification with a certain property. See Radin, supra note 41, at 957. The
methods of defining that interest-i.e., focusing on intent rather than formal right-put this
conception to practical use. See, e.g., Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 710 (holding that if a person thinks
of a certain place as his residence, it should be treated as such for voter registration purposes).
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state's legitimate interest in limiting the voting population to only
"bona fide" residents with a common interest in the community.
1 2
While the language and methods by which the new standards make
this residency determination differ, one of the primary elements is a
focus on the individual's intent rather than his actual possession.
1 13
This approach is easily reconcilable with the personality theory's con-
ception of people's self-identification through property: If a person
thinks of a certain place as his residence or "home base," more flexi-
ble registration standards recognize this self-identification as sufficient
for registration purposes. 114 By focusing on the person's identification
with the property as a means of defining residence, the personality
approach implicitly provides a meaningful standard to ensure the
enfranchisement of the homeless.
C. The Significance of Voting Rights
Perhaps the most fundamental question one should consider in
deciding whether to argue for these non-traditional voting standards
is how important voting rights truly are for homeless individuals.
There are two usual rationales in favor of focusing on voting rights for
homeless persons. First, voting gives homeless persons the opportu-
nity to alleviate their plight through the exercise of power in the polit-
ical arena. 15  This rationale has been questioned by some
commentators, who suggest that the empirical results have not yet
manifested such political power for the homeless in the jurisdictions
where they have been ensured voting rights." 6 Nonetheless, the fact
that the right to vote has not immediately resulted in political clout
for the homeless should not be used as a justification for denying
homeless persons of the opportunity to vote.
The second justification for focusing on voting rights rests on the
fundamental significance of the right to our conception of individual-
ity."l 7 The basis for this rationale is that the right to political partici-
pation is an essential element of self-identification and freedom in our
112. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (noting a state's historic right to
restrict its voting community to "bona fide" residents).
113. See Note, supra note 89, at 237.
114. See Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 710.
115. See, e.g., Tye, Voting Rights of Homeless Residents, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 227
(1986); Note, Building a House of Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless, 59 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 530, 556 (1985).
116. McKittrick, supra note 37, at 396-97. McKittrick argues that the small number of
homeless registrants after Washington, D.C. changed its policy indicates that the homeless will
not be a political force because they are more concerned with daily subsistence than with the
political process. Id.
117. Tye, supra note 115, at 227.
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society."' 8 The inherent value of the right to vote is considered as
separate from what tangible results might be achieved through the
exercise of such right. If we are to recognize the homeless as com-
plete members of society, they must be assured the same basic and
fundamental right of participation as property owners.119
VI. SQUATTING RIGHTS AND THE USES OF THEORY
A. History of Squatting and Squatters' Campaigns
Squatting rights-the rights to occupy property without the
owner's permission 120-- involve issues that are perhaps the antitheses
of those raised in the context of voting rights. Although voting is
recognized as a fundamental right that should not be denied the
homeless for lack of an identifiable property right, squatting involves
the infringement by the homeless on the property rights of others.
Despite this disparity, the same property theories that implicitly
frame the issue of homeless voting rights also play a significant role in
the squatting rights question, and can help provide a positive resolu-
tion. In the voting rights context, this Comment argues for the use of
property theories to recognize a right to vote absent a property right;
in the squatting context, property theories provide a means to argue
for recognition of limited property interests in abandoned or govern-
ment-owned buildings based on both economic utility and a squatter's
personal identification with the property.
Squatting has been a part of American history at least since the
nineteenth century exploration of western America, when gold pros-
pectors illegally settled on land already bought by speculators. 121 His-
torically, squatting has been the "time-hallowed response of the
landless to the contradiction between their own impoverishment and a
surfeit of unutilized property." '1 22 In contemporary times, squatting
118. Id.
119. These two justifications correspond to what Frank Michelman has characterized as the
"instrumental" and "constitutive" functions of political participation in his analysis of the
relation of voting rights and American democracy. See Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy
in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989). The
instrumental approach to politics values voting rights as a means to advance or defend
personal interests formed outside the political arena. Id. at 451. The constitutive valuation
suggests that the process of political participation itself is essential to the self-constitutive
values of identity and freedom. Id. While the extent of Michelman's analysis is beyond the
scope of this Comment, the important point is that both of these valuations of political
participation form an essential part of our conception of democracy, and thus explain why
homeless voting rights is a significant issue.
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has moved from the unsettled wilderness to the inner city, a result of a
tightening of the low-income housing market corresponding with an
increase in housing abandonment.
123
While squatting often has been met with governmental antago-
nism,'24 another response has been the creation of "homesteading"
programs 25 that legitimize squatting to a limited extent. 126  The
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
("ACORN") has played an instrumental role in organizing squatters'
movements in urban areas. 27 A discussion of the ACORN squatters'
campaign in New York City (the "City") illustrates their methods
and tactics.
In 1985, ACORN launched a squatters' campaign after several
unsuccessful attempts to persuade city officials to create a homestead-
ing program using properties the City acquired through tax foreclo-
sure. At the time, the buildings were being auctioned to the highest
bidder. 2 ACORN recruited dozens of low-income families in need
of housing to occupy City-owned buildings illegally. 2 9 Initially, the
City responded by obtaining a temporary restraining order, 30 and it
later bulldozed a building that a squatter had spent months repair-
ing.13 ' Faced with negative public reaction, the City negotiated a set-
tlement with ACORN that resulted in an agreement to convey fifty-
eight buildings to squatters, to provide nearly three million dollars for
building rehabilitation, and to cooperate with former squatters in the
creation of low-income housing.
132
123. The two largest factors contributing to urban squatting have been the abandonment of
private housing because of a withdrawal of private investment, and an increase in FHA-
insured mortgage foreclosures. Id. at 431. See supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the economics of the housing market.
124. Borgos, supra note 6, at 430.
125. "Homesteading" programs essentially are a legalized form of squatting: governmental
entities will authorize and legitimize, on a limited and regulated basis, the occupation and
sometimes legal ownership of unused property. For a discussion of a typical homesteading
program, see Hirsch & Wood, supra note 7, at 614-16.
126. In 1974, the federal government created section 810 of the Housing and Community
Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1988). Implementation of this homesteading act
ultimately favored middle-class applicants, however, doing little to alleviate the problems of
abandonment and low-income housing need. See Borgos, supra note 6, at 431-33.
127. See Borgos, supra note 6, at 433-45; see also Hirsch & Wood, supra note 7 (discussing
ACORN's squatters' campaigns).
128. The auction system was "a dismal failure." Hirsch & Wood, supra note 7, at 610.
More than half of the auctioned buildings were again repossessed because of tax delinquencies;
as a result, several buildings have been torn down. Id
129. Id. at 613.
130. Id. at 614.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 614-15.
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The program is run by the Mutual Housing Association of New
York ("MHANY"), and although it focuses primarily on applicants'
housing needs, it also requires applicants to contribute "sweat-equity"
by working on the buildings, and to prove financial capability' 33 to
rehabilitate and maintain the buildings.' 34 The program also limits
the resale of rehabilitated units to keep them in the low-income hous-
ing market. A homesteader has three transfer options: (1) he can
transfer to a member of his immediate family; (2) he may sell to
another qualifying low-income family for the price that he originally
paid; or (3) he may sell to MHANY, which will resell the unit to a
qualifying low-income family for the price the homesteader originally
paid. 135
The ACORN squatters' campaigns serve both as political pro-
tests against a failure to provide adequate low-income housing, and as
an instrumental means of alleviating this problem.1 36 As such, they
have been characterized as a way of making "radical" principles ame-
nable to the general public:
The squatters insisted that they had a right to decent housing, and
that this right took precedence over the rights of property. In the
abstract, such principles do not command the support of a major-
ity of Americans; national housing policy is certainly not founded
on them. Yet in the particular form posed by the squatters, these
principles were almost unassailable. 37
Thus, squatting has proven to be an effective tool for the homeless,
not only in the direct manner of producing low-income housing, but
also as a means of mobilizing public opinion.
Squatting rights issues have also arisen in the courts. One of the
more interesting cases presents the "necessity defense" as protection
for squatting rights. In Griffin v. United States,3 1 several individuals
133. Although applicants are considered only if their total income is less than 80% of the
standard metropolitan statistical area median, they have to demonstrate the ability to be
responsible for minimal rehabilitation and maintenance costs as well. These financial
requirements are alleviated somewhat by the City's three million dollars committment. Id.
134. Id. at 615.
135. Id.
136. As one commentator explains:
[S]quatting embodied much more than the policy demands of the squatters; it
was a blatant challenge to the assumptions and values on which U.S. housing
policy is founded. The desperation of the squatters mocked the assumption that
Americans are well housed; their eagerness to tear down the boards asserted the
primacy of housing needs over property rights; their uncompromising demand
for the deeds lent substance to the nascent principle of entitlement.
Borgos, supra note 6, at 441-44.
137. Id. at 442.
138. 447 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983).
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entered and opened Washington, D.C. cathedrals to provide over-
night shelter for the homeless. 139 At their trial for illegal entry, the
defendants unsuccessfully attempted to introduce evidence in support
of the necessity defense, which exonerates the commission of a crime
"if the harm resulting from compliance with the law would have sig-
nificantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from.., breach of the
law."' 1 The defendants argued that opening the churches to the
homeless was a "calculated but desperate attempt"' 1 to avoid the
evils of homelessness in the middle of winter.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the defendants had neither shown that their actions would avoid
a "specific, immediate, [and] identifiable"' 42 harm, nor that all other
available measures had been taken-that is, no other shelter was
available. 4 3  The court found that the necessity defense was
improper, believing the illegal entry to be more of a publicity measure
than a true last resort to provide shelter.'" Although the Griffin
court rejected the necessity defense, it implied that the defense could
be raised where squatting was the result of a dire need for shelter
rather than merely a publicity measure. The potential use of the
necessity defense in other contexts, such as civil disobedience, 145 sug-
gests that if the defense is raised in appropriate circumstances, a court
should allow it, even if used partially as a means of politicizing gov-
ernmental failure to address homelessness.
A related squatting rights issue concerns what rights, if any,
squatters may have in illegally occupied premises. In De Villar v. City
of New York,' 46 squatters and other illegal occupants of a City-owned
building sued the City, challenging their eviction. ' 47 The City, which
had acquired the property through tax foreclosure, posted a vacate
139. Id. One of the individual defendants was the late Mitch Snyder of the Community for
Creative Non-Violence, although the organization itself is not named in the action. Id
140. Id
141. Id. at 778.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. "Appellants' motion makes clear that their actions were designed to focus attention on
the plight of the homeless; they were not undertaken as a last resort, after all else had been
attempted, to avoid an immediate harm." Id
145. See Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 79 (1989) (arguing that the defense should be available where crimes have been
committed to avert threats to human life which the defendant in good faith actually perceives);
see also Comment, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the
Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417 (1990-1991) (discussing the potential applicability of the
necessity doctrine to the arrest of the homeless for essential life activities).
146. 628 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
147. Plaintiffs charged that their eviction deprived them of their rights to procedural and
substantive due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Id
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order in an effort to close the building. The squatters sued in federal
court alleging a deprivation of procedural and substantive due pro-
cess. 4" In dismissing the complaint for failure to allege a constitu-
tionally protected right, 14 9 the district court concluded that because
plaintiffs were "trespassers, squatters and illegal occupants," they had
no property interest in the apartments and, hence, no right to protec-
tions. 50 Essentially, the court held that in order for the squatters to
have any right to continued occupation of the building, or procedural
rights prior to eviction, a legal right to possession must first exist.
B. Economic Analysis and Squatting Rights
To evaluate the economic perspective on squatting, one must first
discuss the larger subject of adverse possession. Initially, the basic
principle of exclusivity of property ownership' 5' seems to be at odds
with the concept of adverse possession. The possibility of adverse
possession claims arguably works against the efficient investment of
resources necessary to achieve maximum use of a property by requir-
ing additional expenditures for security and monitoring costs.
152
Thus, as a means of involuntary property transfer, adverse possession
appears inefficient in economic terms.
Several competing economic interests, however, have been
advanced in favor of adverse possession: (1) it eliminates the eco-
nomic costs of proving stale claims in the judicial forum; 3 (2) it
reduces the information and transaction costs involved in discovering
and eliminating old claims to property that limit transferability;' 54
and (3) it maximizes resource use by rewarding the adverse possessor
who makes productive use of a property while punishing the title-
holder who "sleeps on his rights.'" 55 To determine the propriety of
adverse possession, economic theorists seek to maximize the property
resource by weighing the competing utilities of the right of absolute
ownership against the benefits of transferring ownership rights to the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 83-84.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
152. For instance, there would be an over-investment in security measures, and under-
investment in cultivation and development of natural resources. Merrill, Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1122 (1984-1985).
153. Id. at 1128.
154. Id. at 1129.
155. Id. at 1130. Merrill suggests that the economic explanation of this rationale is that it
serves to encourage market transactions by requiring an owner to periodically assert his rights
to the property, thereby "flushing out" offers to purchase the property. Id.
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adverse possessor.
In comparing squatting rights to adverse possession generally,
some of the economic justifications for recognizing adverse possession
would not apply in the squatting rights context. The transaction costs
for curing stale claims to property as a result of boundary disputes or
defective conveyance instruments simply do not arise in the squatting
context, where a homeless person knowingly and purposefully occu-
pies another's building, often that of a governmental entity. Looking
purely at resource maximization, however, yields interesting and use-
ful results. Where buildings are lost to the government through tax
foreclosure, for example, at least two factors indicate that the resource
held very little value to the original owner. First, the owner failed to
generate enough revenue or assets to redeem the taxes before sale.
Second, because most of these buildings are located in "high-risk"
areas, the general disrepair and abandonment illustrates that the own-
ers either explicitly or implicitly decided that the properties were no
longer worth the investment of time or resources necessary to make
them useful. Local governments have likewise failed to maximize the
use of foreclosed property through auction programs, which often
result in higher ultimate transaction costs through repeated. foreclo-
sures and resales.1
57
On the other hand, as ACORN's squatters' campaigns vividly
illustrate, vacant tax-foreclosed buildings do hold significant value to
the homeless. Finding themselves in dire need of housing, the home-
less are willing to invest their labor and what minimal resources they
have to make the buildings habitable. Thus, the economic theory's
basic principle of resource maximization leads to a persuasive argu-
ment for recognition of squatting rights in tax-foreclosed property
through the creation of homesteading programs, despite the theory's
inherent reluctance to interfere with exclusive property ownership
through involuntary exchanges. If property rules are meant to ensure
resource maximization, then governmental distribution of tax-fore-
closed property should give strong consideration to the comparative
value of such property to the homeless, who need it for shelter and are
willing to invest human resources in the buildings.
156. This does not necessarily suggest a case-by-case determination of whether adverse
possession is proper. Indeed, it is possible that economic analysis can deduce an optimum
period for a statute of limitations that will ensure resource maximization. See Ellickson,
Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property
Rights, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 723 (1986) (proposing to use economic analysis to determine an
appropriate statutory period).
157. For a discussion of the failure of the auction system, see Hirsch & Wood, supra note 7,
at 610.
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Indeed, this economic argument is one of the reasons squatters'
campaigns have been so successful. Politicians and community mem-
bers see homesteading programs as a compelling response to homeless
persons' need for shelter because the programs provide shelter with-
out doing violence to the fundamental economic conceptions of a pri-
vate property system:
At a time when Americans were increasingly hostile to anything
perceived as a "giveaway" program, the squatters proclaimed that
they were not looking for a handout but an opportunity. They cast
their demands in terms of individual initiative, mutual assistance,
and the superiority of homeownership, all culturally sanctioned
values in the United States. Their position was bolstered by the
visible failure of the for-profit "private sector" to maintain housing
in their neighborhoods. And homesteading had fiscal appeal as
well; even with the provision of generous rehabilitation loans, it
appeared to be a relatively inexpensive means of producing low-
income housing, and it promised to restore abandoned property to
the tax rolls.1"8
Thus, in the context of squatters' campaigns as a means of establish-
ing homesteading programs, economic analysis plays a valuable posi-
tive role in justifying the legal recognition of squatting rights.
The economic argument for legalized homesteading programs is
limited in its applicability, however. Although homesteading may
provide the best economic use of government-owned, tax-foreclosed
property by maximizing these resources, the same argument may not
be as persuasive in the context of privately-owned, vacant but not
abandoned property. When dealing with private property, society
places great value on exclusivity of ownership and is much more
reluctant to enforce involuntary transfers than in the context of gov-
ernment-owned property. Furthermore, where the private property
owner has not abandoned the property and continues to pay taxes,
there is some indicia that the property continues to hold value to the
owner. Thus, while tax-foreclosed, abandoned property may have a
higher value to a squatter than to the government (or the original
owner), the same conclusion is not as compelling in the non-aban-
doned private property context. Hence, the persuasiveness of the eco-
nomic argument for squatting rights may be limited to situations in
which the squatters' claims do not conflict with a private owner's
rights. 159
158. Borgos, supra note 6, at 442.
159. In fact, the ACORN squatters' campaigns have been limited to city-owned buildings
because of the additional difficulties in fighting private owners for buildings. Hirsch & Wood,
supra note 7, at 613.
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Unfortunately, it is doubtful that the economic theory of prop-
erty rights can serve as a valuable tool in resolving the legal issues that
arise from squatting outside of its support of homesteading programs.
Because property rights provide the basis for human rights,"e° any
legal rights that might arise from squatting would have to emanate
from a property right. Although economic analysis supports the
premise that squatters would make the best economic use of tax-fore-
closed property, their occupation can only be justified by a pre-
existing legal right. Because, absent a homesteading program, squat-
ters are illegal occupants of abandoned property, they have no formal
property right; thus, they have no cognizable legal rights to protect in
an economic analysis. Therefore, legal economists would likely agree
with the court's analysis in De Villar v. City of New York 161 that
squatters have no procedural or substantive due process rights before
being evicted from illegally occupied premises. As the court stated:
Quite clearly, the plaintiffs had no more of a property interest in
those apartments than in any others in the City they might have
trespassed into and encamped within, that is, none at all ....
Because the plaintiffs had no property in the apartments they were
living in, their evictions did not implicate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
162
The court, following the economic theory's equation between prop-
erty rights and: human rights, only considered whether the squatters
had any formal property right, and ignored the possibility that the
squatters' continued occupation might create some kind of non-for-
mal right 163 that would implicate due process concerns.
Economic analysis likewise does not affirmatively answer the
question of whether the necessity defense' 6 should provide rights for
squatters to occupy abandoned buildings. Again, because squatters
have no formal property rights to occupy property absent a home-
steading program, the economic approach would preclude recognition
of the contention that necessity should merit the protection of other-
wise homeless squatters.165 On the other hand, it is entirely possible
160. For a discussion of the relation between property rights and human rights in economic
theory, see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
161. 628 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
162. Id at 83.
163. For instance, the court could have recognized a personal interest in the property that
at least gave rise to a minimal right to procedural due process protection.
164. For a discussion of the nature of the necessity defense, see supra notes 138-45 and
accompanying text.
165. The necessity defense can be partially explained in economic terms as a means of
weighing the competing social utilities of enforcement of a law versus the desirable result (or
harm avoided) by breach of the law. Cf Note, supra note 145, at 84 (characterizing the
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that the decision to allow the necessity defense to protect squatting
rights can be made primarily on a moral, rather than an economic,
basis, which will be discussed next in the context of the personality
theory.
C. Personality Theory and Squatting Rights
The concept of granting rights in property through adverse pos-
session is more easily squared with the personality theory of property
rights than with the competing utilities principle of economic theory.
The personality theory's essential justification for property rights is
the relationship between property and personhood-that is, a self-
identification with the property.' The personality theory distin-
guishes between degrees or types of rights in property based on the
extent of one's personal identification with the property. 67 The con-
cept of recognizing the right of an active occupant of property, as
against an absent titleholder, is a natural consequence of the personal-
ity approach. Radin summarizes the personality theory's argument
for adverse possession as follows:
The title follows the will, or investment of personhood. If the old
title-holder has withdrawn her will, and the new possessor has
entered, a new title follows .... The result of this theory is to
attach normative force, and not merely practical significance, to
the bond developing between adverse possessor and object over
time; and to attach normative force, as well, to the "laches" of the
title-holder who allows this to happen.'
61
As Radin explains, however, although the personality theory rec-
ognizes rights of adverse possessors, it also may impose several limita-
tions on when and how these rights should be recognized. For
example, Radin posits that the personality approach might require a
good faith standard that would foreclose adverse possessors who
knowingly occupy another's property because the essential element of
necessity defense as reflecting a concern for maximizing the greater societal good). But this
characterization is somewhat deceptive because the values being weighed are not exclusively
economic in nature (i.e., in the squatting scenario, the personal need for shelter of the homeless
versus the legal, economic interests of the property-owner). To the extent that the necessity
defense involves or should involve considerations beyond those of economic utility, economic
analysis is an inapt tool for determining its appropriateness. As Posner acknowledges,
economic theory is not a tool of moral analysis, at least insofar as a conception of moral justice
goes beyond or is distinguishable from value maximization. See R. POSNER, supra note 17, at
10.
166. See Radin, supra note 41, at 957. For a general discussion of the personality theory of
property rights, see supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
167. Radin, supra note 41, at 986.
168. Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 739, 745 (1986).
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self-identification is not as convincing where the possessor knows the
property is not his own. 169 Radin notes, however, that an adverse
possessor can still use personality theory by arguing that binding
one's self to an object knowing it is not your own may, in fact, ulti-
mately make it your own. 170 This argument supplies the necessary
self-identification to trigger use of the personality theory.
Radin also notes that it is unlikely that the personality theory
would favor "tacking"-that is, combining successive adverse posses-
sors' time of uninterrupted possession-to meet the possession
requirement of the statute of limitations.' 7' The personality theory's
justification for a statute of limitations is that the statutory period
represents the time required for an adverse possessor to sufficiently
self-identify with the property so that it is appropriate to recognize his
rights in it.' Therefore, subsequent occupants of adversely pos-
sessed property should have to start the statutory period anew.
When urban squatting in abandoned buildings is evaluated under
the personality theory, it is perhaps easier to justify the rights of
squatters to knowingly occupying another's property. A governmen-
tal entity would appear to have minimal self-identification with a tax-
foreclosed building as compared to the personhood invested by a
squatter seeking to make the building his own dwelling. Just as eco-
nomic analysis suggests that the competing economic values of the
property to the government and to the squatter weigh in favor of
granting rights to the otherwise homeless squatter,'73 the personhood
dichotomy similarly attributes more significance to a squatter's claim
of right in seeking permanent shelter than to a disinterested and
absent governmental titleholder.
This personhood argument, which in some senses parallels the
economic resource maximization argument, 74 provides a moral coun-
terpart to the economic justifications for recognizing squatting rights
that have been a large factor in the appeal of homesteading pro-
grams. 75 The message of squatters' campaigns, that the right to
169. Id. at 749.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. It is unclear how personality theory would determine the appropriate time frame
in which to recognize self-identification with property, which may partially explain legal
economists' dissatisfaction with an approach based on personal rather than quantitative,
economic values.
173. For an economic analysis of squatting rights, see supra notes 151-65 and
accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
175. See Borgos, supra note 6, at 443-44.
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decent housing takes precedence over formal property rights,1 76 is
compelling not merely because it makes economic sense, but because
politicians and community members recognize the personal, moral
basis of the squatters' claim of right to the occupied properties.
The "minimal entitlement" argument 77 hinted at by the person-
ality theory provides further support for recognizing squatting rights.
If society accepts that the government bears some responsibility to
ensure that all of its citizens have sufficient "property for per-
sonhood" (at the least, permanent housing), then homesteading pro-
grams provide an ideal vehicle for the implementation of the
necessary redistribution of property. The means of providing such
property are already in the government's hands because it holds title
to the abandoned buildings, and the distribution can be achieved
without adversely affecting the property rights of other citizens.
Homeless advocates' use of this personality-based analysis may fur-
ther bolster the argument for legal recognition of squatting rights
through homesteading programs.
The use of personality theory to support squatting rights, how-
ever, is subject to some limitations as well. As with the economic
arguments for recognizing squatting rights, the personality theory's
justifications for squatting become less persuasive in the context of
privately-owned property.17 8 Where a squatter's claim of right is con-
sidered against that of a private property owner, the weighing of per-
sonhood invested does not so decidedly favor the squatter,
particularly where the private titleholder also has significant connec-
tions to the property. Thus, the moral significance of the personality
approach likewise may be limited to the context of government-owned
property where there is only minimal personhood attached to the
titleholder's claim of right.
The personality theory's disfavor for tacking also may limit rec-
ognized squatting rights. Because occupancy by one person is essen-
tial to the personality approach's justification for adverse possession,
on a theoretical level, squatting should lead only to a limited property
right vested in the individual squatter and not an absolute property
right. Interestingly enough, just such a limitation is included in the
New York City homesteading program: The program restricts trans-
fer of housing units rehabilitated by squatters to members of the
176. Id.
177. Radin, supra note 41, at 990. For a discussion of the concept of property as a human
right, see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of the limitations of economic justification of squatting, see supra
notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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squatter's immediate family, to other needy individuals at the original
price, or back to the housing program itself, creating a significantly
limited right of ownership for the squatter. 179 Although there are
practical reasons for such a limitation (primarily to keep the units in
the low-income housing market by preventing resale for profit), the
means by which this goal is accomplished demonstrate an implicit use
of the personality theory by focusing on an individual relationship
with the property, and fundamentally are in accord with the type of
right a personality approach justifies. This analysis illustrates the use-
fulness of a personality theory of property rights in the squatting con-
text, both as a moral justification for legalized homesteading
programs, and as an instrumental means for designing and imple-
menting such programs. Arguably, the success of squatters' cam-
paigns in leading to homesteading programs is attributable to their
appeal to both the economic and personality theories of property
rights.
While the economic approach does not prove to be very useful
outside of the context of legalized homesteading programs, °80 the per-
sonality theory may be a valuable tool in the other issues raised by
squatting. The question raised in De Villar v. City of New York 181 of
whether squatters have any rights in illegally occupied property
would not be so simply dismissed under a personality approach. In
personality theory, the question of right is rooted in the extent of self-
identification with property rather than simply the formal property
right itself."8 2 Accordingly, personality theory allows an argument
that the squatters' continued occupation, albeit illegal, gives rise to
some form of right to be protected. While the extent of this right may
not be great enough to justify relinquishing title to squatters without a
formal homesteading program, self-identification through continued
occupation may raise due process concerns. The personality theory's
recognition of a distinction between human and property rights, and
its emphasis on the constitutive nature of property occupation, thus
provide potential arguments for sustaining the De Villar complaint.
The personality approach also may provide a basis for recogniz-
179. Hirsch & Wood, supra note 7, at 615. For a discussion of the New York homesteading
program, see supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of the limits of economic theory in the context of squatting, see supra
notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
181. 628 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
182. See Radin, supra note 41, at 988-89. For a discussion of the personality theory's
distinction between rights created through self-identification versus merely formal property
rights, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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ing the necessity, defense183 as a means of protecting squatters. The
lack of clear economic grounds for allowing the necessity defense
illustrates that the question of whether the harm caused by not ille-
gally squatting on property (that is, the harm of remaining homeless)
significantly exceeds the harm that actually results from the breach of
the law is, at heart, a moral judgment a court must make. As such,
this question of comparative harm would be evaluated best in light of
the personality theory's personhood dichotomy. In that context, the
issue becomes whether the interest of the property owner, essentially a
fungible interest (at least in the case of government-owned abandoned
property), should outweigh the interest of a squatter seeking shelter, a
fundamentally personal interest. 8 4  The weighing of comparative
harm, when viewed in this manner, favors the "illegal" squatter and
puts the primacy of housing needs over merely formal property rights.
The personality-based analysis suggests that the necessity defense can
appropriately be raised as protection for squatters who occupy build-
ings as a means of obtaining the fundamental human need of shelter,
at least where the investment of personality by others is minimal.
Here again, personality theory can provide a persuasive moral argu-
ment and potential legal framework for protecting squatters who
otherwise would.be homeless.' 85
D. The Role of Squatting in Combating Homelessness
Ultimately, the effectiveness of squatters' campaigns as an instru-
mental means of providing housing for the homeless is somewhat lim-
ited. Although squatters' campaigns have led to homesteading
programs which generate low-income housing, s6 and have drawn
increased attention to the crisis of homelessness, 8 7 they are not a
complete solution. The limited supply of buildings suitable for reha-
bilitation by squatters,'88 the inability of many of the homeless to con-
tribute labor or even the "minimal" fiscal costs of rehabilitation and
183. For a discussion of the necessity defense in the context of squatting, see supra notes
138-45 and accompanying text.
184. See id. at 959-60 & 986-88 (defining fungible and personal property interests).
185. For a discussion of other potential uses of the necessity defense as protection for the
rights of homeless persons, see Comment, supra note 145.
186. The New York program created 180 units of permanent housing because of the
squatters' efforts. Hirsch & Wood, supra note 7, at 617.
187. See id. at 614, 616-17 (noting the usefulness of squatters' campaigns in attracting
public attention).
188. See Schuman, The Agony and the Equity A Critique of Self-Help Housing, in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 6, at 466 (noting that the amount of "self-
help" housing available for homesteading programs is negligible compared to the increase in
higher-income housing due to gentrification).
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maintenance,189 and the ever-present difficulties of low-income home-
ownership"9 make homesteading programs only partially responsive
to the housing needs of the homeless. Nonetheless, homesteading
programs do provide permanent housing to at least some segments of
the homeless population, and serve to mobilize public opinion in favor
of further initiatives. By delineating the implicit role of property the-
ories in homesteading efforts, and by exploring the potential for
explicit application of property theory principles, this Comment may
help to make squatters' campaigns even more effective.
VII. CONCLUSION
To the homeless and their advocates, the realm of legal theory
may seem far removed from the problems of homelessness. The the-
ory of rights to which a society subscribes, however, has a profound
impact on how the law affects the homeless. The dominant role
played by the economic utility theory in the American system of
property ownership explains the workings of a housing market that
has failed, in large part, to respond to the needs of the homeless. Fur-
thermore, the adoption of an economic approach that equates prop-
erty rights with human rights can result in the exclusion of the
homeless from rights not typically considered as "property" rights,
such as voting. The role of personality theory, which focuses on the
importance of property ownership to self-development, may merely
reinforce the problems inherent in the economic approach because
our society is unwilling, for the most part, to think seriously about
redistribution.
Advocates, however, can use theory in a positive way in the con-
text of homelessness. Alternative approaches to property rights, such
as the personality theory, provide the principles by which enfranchise-
ment of the homeless population can be ensured. The personality the-
ory and economic analysis can both be valuable tools in the context of
squatting rights, where property theories provide both economic and
moral justification for the creation of legalized homesteading pro-
grams to provide low-income housing. This analysis of the implicit,
yet fundamental, role of theory, and this demonstration of the poten-
tial uses of theory in specific homeless issues can serve as a model for
189. Id. at 465 (noting that homesteading is only a viable alternative for the younger and
more energetic of the poor, and does not respond to the needs of the elderly, the disabled,
women with child-care responsibilities, and employed people unable to support themselves and
their families if they were to participate in a homesteading program).
190. Id. (noting the growing gap between housing costs and income, and that the reduced
costs of home-ownership through "self-help" programs such as homesteading only partially
respond to this problem).
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homeless advocates to implement in these and other contexts, and can
help to ensure that the crisis of homelessness is not allowed to
continue.
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